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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Allen Wayne Gillespie attempts to appeal from the district court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction and executing without reduction the unified sentence of 
seven years, with three years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to felony DUI. 
Because Gillespie waived his right to "appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief' 
pursuant to a plea agreement, his appeal should be dismissed. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While on supervised probation for a prior DUI conviction, Gillespie drove 
while intoxicated and with a suspended driver's Iicense.1 (PSI, pp.2, 11, 19.) 
When officers attempted to detain him, Gillespie physically resisted, "exposed 
his buttocks to the officers," and '''[m]ade himself vomit.'" (PSI, p.2.) He was 
eventually transported to the police department, where "he continued to be 
noncompliant," "threatened to urinate in the office," and spat at an officer. (PSI, 
p.2.) After two unsuccessful attempts to obtain a breath sample, Gillespie finally 
cooperated with the breathalyzer test and blew a .130/.136. (PSI, p.2.) 
The state charged Gillespie with felony DUI (two prior DUI convictions 
within 10 years) and three misdemeanors: DWP, assault, and resisting and/or 
obstructing officers. (R., pp.26-29.) Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea 
1 The presentence investigator wrote that Gillespie committed the DUI that is the 
subject of this appeal five days after being released from misdemeanor 
probation. (PSI, p.19.) This appears to be a misstatement, as the PSI otherwise 
reflects that Gillespie did not complete his misdemeanor probation until March 
30, 2011, and he committed the instant offense on March 4, 2011. (PSI, pp.2, 
11,19.) 
1 
agreement, Gillespie pled guilty as charged and the parties stipulated that 
Gillespie "shall be sentenced to 36 months fixed and 48 months indeterminate, 
with credit for time served and the court to retain Jurisdiction and recommend 
placement in the CAPP program during the retained jurisdiction." (R., pp.18-20.) 
The parties also agreed that if Gillespie "successfully completes the retained 
jurisdiction the court shall suspend the execution of the sentence and place 
[Gillespie] on supervised probation for a period of four (4) years." (R., p.19.) 
The plea agreement also contained the following appeal waiver provision: "The 
Defendant waives appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief." (R., p.19.) 
Gillespie and his attorney both signed the agreement and, in so doing, 
specifically represented that Gillespie "understands this agreement and by his 
signature agrees to the terms of the agreement." (R., p.20.) 
The district court accepted Gillespie's pleas and, consistent with the plea 
agreement, imposed a unified sentence of seven years with three years fixed for 
the felony DUI.2 (R., pp.46-47.) Also consistent with the agreement, the court 
retained jurisdiction and specifically recommended that Gillespie be placed in the 
CAPP program. (R., p.46.) Ultimately, the department of correction determined 
that Gillespie was ineligible for placement in the CAPP program and placed him 
instead in the Therapeutic Community (TC) program. (R., pp.57-58; see also 
APSI, p.2.) Gillespie did not perform well in the TC program and, less than six 
months into the "9 to 12 month program," TC staff recommended that the court 
2 The court imposed concurrent jail sentences for each of the misdemeanors to 
which Gillespie pled guilty. (6/10/11 Tr., p.16, L.19 - p.17, L.7.) Gillespie does 
not challenge those sentences on appeal. 
2 
relinquish jurisdiction. (APSI cover and pp.1-3.) The court followed the 
recommendation, relinquished jurisdiction and ordered Gillespie's sentence 
executed without reduction. (R., pp.86-88.) 
Gillespie filed a notice of appeal within 42 days of the court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.1 09-13.) 
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ISSUES 
Gillespie states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction over Mr. Gillespie, or alternatively, by not reducing his 
sentence sua sponte pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should Gillespie's appeal be dismissed because, as part of the stipulated 
plea agreement, Gillespie waived his right to "appeal and Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 relief?" 
2. Alternatively, has Gillespie failed to establish that the district court abused 
its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and ordering his sentence 




Gillespie's Appeal Should Be Dismissed Because He Knowingly And Voluntarily 
Waived His Right To Appeal Pursuant To The Plea Agreement 
A. Introduction 
Gillespie argues that the district court abused its discretion by 
relinquishing jurisdiction and executing without reduction the unified sentence of 
seven years with three years fixed imposed upon his guilty plea to felony DUI. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-16.) Gillespie's appeal should be dismissed because, as 
part of the stipulated plea agreement, he knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
right to "appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief." (R., p.19.) 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A plea agreement is contractual in nature, must be measured by contract 
law standards, and as a question of law, [the appellate court] exercises free 
review." State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,495,129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (citing 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50,63,106 P.3d 376, 389 (2004)). Where the waiver 
of the right to appeal is entered as part of a plea agreement, the appellate court 
"employ[s] the same analysis as [it] would in determining the validity of any plea 
of guilty." State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994), 
quoted in Cope, 142 Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245. 
C. Gillespie Knowingly And Voluntarily Waived The Right To Appeal The 
District Court's Rulings 
The right of a criminal defendant to appeal matters relating to his 
conviction and/or sentence is a statutory right that may be waived. State v. 
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Cope, 142 Idaho 492,496, 129 P.3d 1241, 1245 (2006); State v. Murphy, 125 
Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994) (citing I.C. § 19-2801). When the 
waiver of the right to appeal is included as a term of a plea agreement, such 
waiver is enforceable as long as the record shows that it was voluntarily, 
knowingly, and inte"igently made. Cope, 142 Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245; 
Murphy, 125 Idaho at 456, 872 P.2d at 719; State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482, 
484,943 P.2d 72, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Gi"espie acknowledges the appeal waiver provision of his plea agreement 
but contends the "waiver does not bar the present appeal" because, he argues, 
the waiver only extends to his right to appeal from the judgment and sentence, 
not to the court's order relinquishing jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) 
Alternatively, he argues the appeal waiver is ambiguous and, as such, must be 
interpreted in his favor to permit the present appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) 
Neither of Gi"espie's arguments have merit. 
The stipulated plea agreement is unambiguous. In exchange for 
Gillespie's plea of guilty to felony DUI and three misdemeanors (DWP, assault 
and resisting and obstructing police officers), the parties agreed that Gillespie 
would be sentenced to a unified term of seven years, with three years fixed, with 
the court retaining jurisdiction and recommending Gi"espie's placement in the 
CAPP program. (R., pp.18-19.) Gi"espie stipulated to the imposition of that 
sentence and specifically agreed to "waive[] appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
relief." (R., p.19.) Gillespie and his attorney both signed the agreement and, in 
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so doing, acknowledged that Gillespie understood the agreement and agreed to 
its terms. (R., p.20.) 
Pursuant to the plain language of the plea agreement, Gillespie waived, 
without any express or implied limitation, his right to "appeal and Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35 relief." (R., p.19.) Although Gillespie's appellate counsel apparently 
believes that the scope of Gillespie's appeal waiver did not include a waiver of 
the right to appeal the district court's ultimate decision, made after judgment, to 
relinquish jurisdiction and order Gillespie's sentence executed without reduction, 
neither the plain language of the appeal waiver provision nor the applicable law 
supports that position. 
Thi$ is not a case, like State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482, 484, 943 P.2d 
72, 74 (Ct. App. 1997), where the defendant agreed to a limited waiver of the 
right to appeal only from the "judgment and sentence." To the contrary, the 
appeal waiver provision of the plea agreement in this case is extremely broad 
and includes an unlimited waiver of the right to "appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 
35 relief." (R., p.19.) Gillespie was aware when he executed the agreement and 
entered his pleas that the district court would be retaining jurisdiction. (See R., 
p.19.) He was also aware that the court would only be required to place him on 
probation if he "successfully complete[d] the retained jurisdiction." (Id.) Had 
Gillespie wished to retain the right to appeal the district court's ultimate 
determination whether to place him on probation following the period of retained 
jurisdiction he could easily have done so by requiring the state to include such 
provision in the written plea agreement. Gillespie did not do so, however, and 
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agreed instead to plead guilty and waive, without limitation, his appellate rights 
and right to Rule 35 relief. (R., p.19.) 
That the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction is itself an 
appealable order under Idaho's appellate rules does not support Gillespie's 
position that he has the right in this case to appeal from that order. (See 
Appellant's brief, p.7 (citing, inter alia, Rules 11 (c)(9) and 14, I.A.R., for 
proposition that "Gillespie may appeal a decision to relinquish jurisdiction of 
right").) As previously discussed, the right of a criminal defendant to appeal 
matters pertaining to his or her conviction and sentence is a statutory right that 
may be waived. Cope, 142 Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245; Murphy, 125 Idaho 
at 457, 872 P.2d at 720. Moreover, the meaning and scope of the appeal 
waiver, like other provisions of the plea agreement, is dictated by the language of 
the agreement itself, not by the appellate rules. See,~, State v. Person, 145 
Idaho 293, 298, 178 P.3d 658, 663 (Ct. App. 2007) (examining language of plea 
agreement to determine its meaning). Pursuant to the unambiguous language of 
the plea agreement in this case, Gillespie waived, without limitation, his right to 
"appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief." Because Gillespie executed an 
unlimited waiver of his appellate rights and right to Rule 35 relief, his appeal from 
the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and ordering his sentence 
executed without reduction should be dismissed.3 
3 Even if this Court concludes that the term "waives appeal," as it is used in the 
plea agreement, is ambiguous as it pertains to Gillespie's ability to appeal the 
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction, there is nothing ambiguous about 
Gillespie's waiver of "Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief." (R., p.19.) Regardless of 
the propriety of Gillespie's appellate challenge to the court's decision to 
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II. 
Alternatively, Gillespie Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused 
Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Gillespie argues that the district court abused its discretion by 
relinquishing jurisdiction without giving sufficient consideration to several factors 
that he claims are mitigating, including his traumatic childhood, mental condition, 
acceptance of responsibility, family support and the efforts he made while in the 
retained jurisdiction program. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-15.) Citing the same 
factors, he also contends that the district court abused its discretion by not sua 
sponte reducing his sentence when it relinquished jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.15-16.) Even if this Court considers the merits of Gillespie's appellate claims, 
Gillespie has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499,873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse 
relinquish jurisdiction, Gillespie's claim on appeal that the district court abused its 
discretion by not "reducing his sentence sua sponte pursuant to Rule 35" is in 
direct contravention of his express waiver of Rule 35 relief and, as such, is not 
properly before this Court. 
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of that discretion. See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 
(1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 
1990). A court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse 
of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. 
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Contrary to Gillespie's assertions on appeal, a review of the record in this case 
supports the district court's determination that Gillespie was not a suitable 
candidate for probation, particularly in light of his extensive criminal record, his 
failures to take advantage of rehabilitative opportunities and his poor 
performance during the period of retained jurisdiction. 
Thirty-eight-year-old Gillespie has a 20-year history of violating the law. 
His criminal record occupies more than eight pages of the PSI and includes 34 
misdemeanor and five felony convictions. (PSI, ppA-11, 18.) His conviction in 
this case represents his second felony DUI conviction and his fifth DUI conviction 
overall. (PSI, ppA-11.) The majority of his other convictions also appear to be 
for alcohol and driving related offenses - e.g., minor in possession (amended 
from DUI), unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, "driving with spirit, liquor in 
body," no auto insurance (three convictions), reckless driving, driving on a 
suspended license (10 convictions), open container, pedestrian under the 
influence, failure to purchase driver's license (amended from DWP), and unsafe 
operation of a vehicle (amended from inattentive/careless driving). (PSI, ppA-
11.) He has also been convicted of numerous property crimes and crimes of 
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violence, including assault, resisting arrest, criminal damage (three convictions), 
endangerment, criminal damage per domestic violence, and disorderly conduct 
per domestic violence. (PSI, pp.7-11.) 
As a result of his prior convictions, Gillespie has been afforded multiple 
opportunities for probation. (PSI, pp.4-13.) He appears to have completed 
some of those probationary periods without incident, but violated others by 
committing new crimes, consuming alcohol and using illegal substances, 
including marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamine. (Id.) He has served three 
prison terms (PSI, pp.12-13) and has also participated in at least three 
substance abuse treatment programs, including staying for approximately six 
months at what appears to be a residential treatment facility (PSI, p.18). Prior 
sanctions and treatment opportunities have not assisted Gillespie in overcoming 
his substance abuse issues nor deterred him from committing new crimes. 
Gillespie himself admits that, when he is not on probation, he reverts to 
consuming alcohol and, he states, "It's like I just got out of trouble, and then I get 
in trouble again." (PSI, p.17.) Even that admission does not appear to be 
entirely forthcoming, as the PSI indicates Gillespie has consumed alcohol and 
illegal substances even while on probation (PSI, 12-13, 17) and, in fact, was on 
misdemeanor probation when he committed the felony DUI of which he was 
convicted in this case (PSI, pp.2, 11, 19). 
Despite Gillespie's demonstrated unwillingness or inability to abstain from 
alcohol and illegal substances and to otherwise conform his behavior to the 
requirements of the law, the district court, in an exercise of leniency, followed the 
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plea agreement and retained jurisdiction to afford Gillespie yet another 
opportunity to prove his amenability to community supervision. (R., pp.46-47; 
6/10/11 Tr., p.11, L.22 - p.12 L.5, p.13, Ls. 7 -11.) Gillespie utterly failed to take 
advantage of that opportunity, however, as he failed to complete two of the three 
programs in which he was enrolled, including the core Therapeutic Community 
(TC) program which is specifically "designed and structured to create an 
environment for social learning and change" and includes "intense drug and 
alcohol treatment." (APSI, p.1.) 
According to TC staff, Gillespie "started his TC programming with an air of 
arrogance," "seemed surly and insolent," and "demonstrated no desire to follow 
the rules." (APSI, p.2.) He received a written warning for violating program 
rules, was "pulled up a significant number of times for his negative behavior" 
and, despite numerous interventions by staff and other program participants, 
displayed neither interest nor motivation "to invest time and energy in his TC 
programming in order for him to change to become a productive member of 
society." (APSI, pp.2-4; APSI Discharge Summary, pp.1, 3.) TC staff 
recognized Gillespie's minimal accomplishments during the program but noted 
that, "[o]verall, there has been little significant change in Mr. Gillespie" as a result 
of his programming. (APSI Discharge Summary, pp.1-2.) Ultimately, the staff 
concluded that Gillespie "remain[ed] a high-risk for reoffending within the 
community" and, as such, was not an appropriate candidate for probation. 
(APSI, p.4) In light of this information, the district court acted well within its 
discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction. 
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In arguing an abuse of discretion Gillespie cites a number of mitigating 
factors that he claims militate against the district court's decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-15.) While it is undoubtedly true, as 
asserted by Gillespie, that he had a traumatic childhood, that he suffers from 
depression and dyslexia, that he purported to accept responsibility for his actions 
that led to his convictions in this case, and that he is supported by his family, 
these considerations in no way diminish the district court's conclusion that 
Gillespie would not be successful on probation. Gillespie has a history of 
drinking and driving and was deemed to pose a high risk of reoffense. (PSI, 
p.19; APSI, p.4.) His programming during the retained jurisdiction period did not 
reduce that risk. Considering all the evidence, and giving deference to the 
district court's ability to weigh that evidence, Gillespie has failed to show an 
abuse of discretion. 
D. Gillespie Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion By Not Sua Sponte Reducing His Sentence Upon Relinquishing 
Jurisdiction 
Upon relinquishing jurisdiction, a court may order the original sentence 
executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 35. 
I.C.R. 35. A court's decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion subject to the well-established standards governing whether a 
sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. 
App. 2009). Those standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any 
reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the 
objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 
13 
P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). 
Citing the same factors he claims militated against the relinquishment of 
jurisdiction, Gillespie argues that the district court abused its discretion by not 
sua sponte reducing the unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, 
imposed upon his conviction for felony DUI. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) For 
the reasons already set forth in section II.C., supra, and incorporated herein by 
reference, Gillespie has failed to show that he was entitled to a reduction of his 
sentence. Gillespie has failed to show an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that Gillespie's appeal be dismissed. 
Alternatively, the state requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction and executing without reduction the sentence imposed 
upon Gillespie's guilty plea to felony DUI. 
DATED this 9th day of November 2012. 
LORI A. FLEMING 
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